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Abstract 
 
In laboratory experiments, we compare the ability of 
trigger strategies with that of (relatively complex) 
review strategies to coordinate capacity decisions in 
supply chains when demand forecasts are based on 
private information. While trigger strategies punish 
apparently uncooperative behavior (misstated demand 
forecasts) immediately, review strategies only punish 
when apparently misstated information culminates over 
several periods. We contribute to the existing literature 
on capacity coordination in supply chains by showing 
that repeated game strategies lead to a significant 
degree of forecast misrepresentation, although they 
theoretically support the truth-telling equilibrium. 
However, forecast misrepresentation is more 
pronounced in review strategies. This behavioral effect 
is diametrically opposed to the theoretically predicted 
benefit of review strategies. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Consider a buyer (female pronouns) who asks her 
long-term supplier (male pronouns) to build capacity for 
a newly developed, innovative product’s component. 
Before and while developing the product, the buyer 
conducts market research to estimate the market 
potential of this product and gain further end-customer 
insights. The buyer therefore obtains demand forecasts 
that are not immediately available to the supplier, but 
are valuable for his capacity decisions. When facing a 
low demand forecast, the buyer can choose between two 
information sharing strategies: First, she may signal a 
high demand forecast to her supplier, thereby 
encouraging a high capacity investment. However, if her 
orders turn out to be low, she risks losing her supplier’s 
trust in their future business interactions. Second, she 
may want to avoid the risk of losing her supplier’s trust 
and therefore share the real demand forecast. 
To foster honest information sharing, the supplier 
may setup an information technology system that 
ignores (punishes) apparently inflated demand 
forecasts. In our model context, the basic punishment 
strategy idea is to avoid forecast inflation through the 
supplier’s threat to ignore future forecasts if the buyer’s 
orders turn out to be low, although she reported a high 
demand forecast. Trigger strategies – that punish 
apparently misstated forecasts immediately - would 
entirely avoid efficiency losses if a forecast can be 
unambiguously identified as either honest, or a lie. 
However, random demand events outside the buyer’s 
control, may render an initially truthfully shared 
forecast highly unlikely. In this case, trigger strategies 
result in ignored forecasts although the buyer reported 
honestly, thus implying an unnecessary loss in 
efficiency. Review strategies overcome this issue by 
observing a buyer’s forecasting behavior over several 
periods and only punish after repeated anomalies. 
Review strategies dominate trigger strategies, because 
they are expected to introduce punishment phases less 
often [23]). 
While the theoretical comparison of trigger and 
review strategies provides a clear-cut prediction for 
supply chains with rational and profit-maximizing 
actors, it is not clear if review strategies’ efficiency 
gains can be sustained for real decision makers, who 
may act boundedly rational, or pursue objectives other 
than profit maximization. In this study, we conduct 
laboratory experiments to evaluate review strategies. 
Although we believe that research on repeated game 
strategies can benefit from other empirical approaches 
(e.g., interview studies), we see one central advantage in 
experiments: With experiments, the critical aspects of 
repeated game strategies can be controlled and therefore 
a highly internally valid comparison of review and 
trigger strategies is possible. It is difficult to evaluate 
repeated game strategies in the field, as it seems highly 
problematic for researchers to discern whether 
analytical forecasts (e.g., from an enterprise resource 
planning systems) are inflated due to good will (e.g., 
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factoring in expert knowledge), or due to strategic 
considerations (e.g., encouraging high capacity 
investments). 
We focus our study very specifically on buyers’ 
information sharing behavior. Buyers deal with an 
automated (computerized) supplier who follows a 
repeated game strategy, i.e., a trigger strategy, or a 
review strategy. We design the repeated game strategies 
such that truth-telling is the profit maximizing strategy. 
With this design, we ensure that all of the proposed 
repeated game strategy’s critical parameters are 
common knowledge (e.g., the signals that are assessed 
as non-reliable, the kind of punishment after a non-
reliable assessment, etc.). Implementing an automated 
strategy separates us – to the best of our knowledge – 
from existing experimental studies on lying: Several 
studies investigate the antecedents of lying, or the 
impact of punishment and reputation systems on 
information sharing in human-human interaction (see 
literature review). However, an analysis of whether 
subjects follow a certain equilibrium strategy induced 
by another automated player following a repeated game 
strategy is not part of this literature. This distinction is 
important, because in human-human interactions 
without common-knowledge pre-committed repeated 
game strategies, lying may occur because the 
information sharing party correctly perceives this as the 
payoff maximizing strategy. In our setup, however, we 
rule this motive out by ensuring that truth-telling is 
payoff maximizing. We can therefore focus precisely on 
the behavioral effects of direct punishments (trigger 
strategy) vs. delayed punishments (review strategies) on 
truth-telling and supply chain efficiency. 
Our contribution to the supply chain literature on 
forecast sharing and coordination is twofold. First, we 
show that there is a substantial degree of lying, even in 
situations where truth-telling is the profit-maximizing 
strategy. We observe that our analyzed review strategies 
are less effective than theoretically predicted. Thus, the 
gap between explicitly defined repeated game strategies 
and unstructured repeated interaction is lower than 
normative analysis predicts. Second, we show that 
buyers confronted with a review strategy convey 
unreliable signals significantly more often than buyers 
confronted with a trigger strategy. The theoretically 
predicted effect of fewer punishment phases in review 
strategies is offset by the behavioral tendency to lie 
more frequently. Overall, we find no significant supply 
chain performance differences between the trigger 
strategy and the review strategy. 
 
                                                 
1 The sequential rationality concept predicts that there is no 
coordination in the last round of the game. Applying backward 
2. Literature Review 
 
In the remainder, we discuss theoretical and 
experimental work on information sharing in the supply 
chain management area, before reviewing experimental 
work that addresses information sharing conflicts in 
more general settings. 
 
2.1 Supply chain management 
 
A lack of information sharing may cause efficiency 
losses (see, among other, [6, 19, 23] and the references 
therein). However, since supply chain parties are legally 
independent, differing goals may hamper truthful 
information sharing and the trust of the information 
receiving party may be lost due to the parties’ strategic 
interaction. Information sharing in supply chains 
attracts research on normative models and on behavioral 
studies. 
The normative stream analyzes how coordination 
mechanisms, such as contractual agreements, or 
repeated game strategies, provide incentives to ensure 
truth-telling and trust between the supply chain parties. 
Corresponding work assumes that all parties are totally 
rational utility maximizers. Models of one-shot games, 
or finitely repeated games1, show that complex non-
linear signaling, or screening, schemes can boost supply 
chain efficiency compared to simple linear transfer 
schemes (wholesale price contracts). While the research 
on signaling and screening contracts culminated in an 
immense body of knowledge for all kinds of supply 
chain planning situations (see [4, 6] and citing articles), 
there is still little empirical evidence that these contract 
formats are widely applied in practice (see [23], p. 81, 
or [5], pp. 474). Signaling and screening contracts often 
only serve as a benchmark for simpler schemes. 
Moreover, simpler wholesale price contracts prove to be 
effective when coupled with repeated game strategies 
(e.g., trigger strategy, review strategy) in infinitely 
repeated games. In this case, cooperation can be 
sustained if the future is valued sufficiently high, i.e., 
the discount factor is sufficiently large [23, 25–27]. We 
contribute to the literature on information sharing in 
supply chains by comparing two repeated game 
strategies ― a trigger strategy and a review strategy ― 
in controlled laboratory experiments with a specific 
focus on buyers’ behavior. 
The behavioral work on information sharing in 
supply chains challenges the normative prediction that 
shared information is nothing but cheap talk (see [7] for 
a comprehensive review on cheap talk experiments). 
induction then indicates that the finitely repeated game collapses to 
the one-shot game [13]. 
Page 1529
  
Özer et al. [21, 22], Hyndman et al. [17], and Ebrahim-
Khanjari et al. [9] study the performance of wholesale 
price contracts in combination with - theoretically 
ineffective – forecast information sharing in laboratory 
experiments. A general insight is that the theoretical 
analysis of strategic forecast inflation in wholesale price 
contracts overstates the observed efficiency losses, 
because human decision makers tend to trust 
information that they believe is truthfully shared. We 
contribute to this stream of research by analyzing the 
information sharing behavior in a situation where truth-
telling is the expected profit maximizing strategy. 
 
2.2 Information sharing in laboratory 
experiments 
 
Two players usually interact in behavioral 
experiments on information sharing: One player 
communicates the private information, while the other 
player receives the signal. Experimental literature 
focuses on two aspects of the game, (1) the reaction of 
the signal receiver to non-reliable signals, and (2) the 
preconditions which influence the sender’s signal. In 
this literature review, as in our experiment, we focus on 
the behavior of the signal sender (= buyer) (e.g., [3]). 
In experimental studies, lying, i.e., senders reporting 
non-reliable signals, frequently occurs, because it 
maximizes the sender’s payoff. For example, only 39% 
of all subjects are honest and if they do not interact with 
others, the observed signal is private information, which 
even the experimenter does not know [12]. As soon as 
the subjects interact with other subjects, the relative 
frequency of honesty increases to 56% [24], or 66% 
[16], suggesting that the degree of lie aversion [20] 
increases if another subject faces negative consequences 
due to non-reliable signals. The frequency of non-
reliable signals also depends on how often these 
negative consequences occur: Subjects behave more 
honest when the negative impact that lying has on others 
increases [14]. In our experimental design, the signal 
receiving supplier is an automated agent. Lying, 
therefore, has no financial consequences for human 
subjects and, from a behavioral perspective, seems more 
likely to be observed. Our experimental design, 
therefore, tests repeated game strategies when it seems 
most beneficial to apply them. 
The frequency of lying does not only depend on its 
impact on others, but also on individual benefits. As the 
frequency of non-reliable signals decreases, the lower 
the own benefit from such signals are [14]. Hence, one 
does not expect any non-reliable signals if the signal 
sender derives no monetary benefit from providing such 
signals. In addition, the frequency of non-reliable 
signals increases if the true signal is never revealed to 
the recipient [2]. In other words, lying increases if the 
buyer knows that the supplier will never discover 
whether the signal he received from the buyer was 
honest or not. In sum, a simple way to decrease non-
reliable signals is to ensure that such signals have a 
negative effect. 
A simple approach to reduce the benefit of non-
reliable signals is to observe the behavior of subjects and 
to punish frequent non-reliable signals by means of a 
reputation mechanism. The effect of reputation 
mechanisms and punishment has been studied more 
generally in cooperative acts, in which the behavior of 
others is directly observable and can therefore be 
punished more than in unverifiable information sharing. 
Initially, cooperation is high, but decreases over time if 
it is repeated finitely (e.g., [1, 28]). The punishment of 
uncooperative behavior primarily helps to sustain 
cooperation over time [10]. While uncooperative 
behavior can be clearly identified and punished exactly 
when such actions are observable, punishments are less 
effective when they are not observable. In other words, 
if players only see the outcome, but not the associated 
action, they do not punish as often [15]. For our 
experiments, this implies that buyers would not expect 
too much punishment if game strategies are not 
repeated, because behavior cannot unambiguously be 
identified as cooperative or not. Thus, our study 
contributes in this context by determining whether 
carefully structured strategies can overcome this 
behavioral tendency by providing automated 
punishment rules. 
In sum, the existing literature clearly shows that 
punishment mechanisms foster cooperation. However, 
this effect is usually hampered when signals’ reliability 
can only be assessed probabilistically. Repeated game 
strategies seem to be a good candidate to boost 
efficiency in such environments. Since signals in our 
setting cannot be unambiguously categorized as truthful 
or not, trigger strategies are theoretically less effective 
than review strategies. We contribute to the existing 
literature by comparing competing strategies in 
carefully devised laboratory experiments. 
 
3. Repeated game strategies 
 
One-shot game: We consider the supply chain setup 
as described in Ren et al. [23]. The supplier has to build 
up capacity, 𝐾, before the end-customer demand, 𝑑, is 
realized. The buyer orders the realized demand, 𝑑, from 
her supplier, which yields an end-customer price of 𝑟. 
The supplier charges a wholesale price, 𝑤, for every unit 
delivered to the buyer. The supplier’s unit capacity cost 
is 𝑐. Table 1 summarizes the notation of the game. 
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Table 1. Notation of the one-shot game 
𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}; 𝑑 Random end-customer demand; 
demand realization from 𝐷𝑖 
𝐹𝑖(∙); 𝑓𝑖(∙), 𝑖
∈ {ℎ, 𝑙} 
Cumulative distribution function 
(CDF); probability distribution 
function (PDF) for 𝐷𝑖 
𝜇𝑖; 𝜎𝑖,  𝑖 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}  Mean; standard deviation of 𝐷𝑖 
with 𝜎ℎ = 𝜎𝑙 = 𝜎 
𝑝 Probability of high market 
demand  
𝑟 End-customer price 
𝑤 Wholesale price (paid from buyer 
to supplier) for each unit 
delivered 
𝑐 Supplier’s unit capacity cost 
𝑠 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙} Customer’s signal of demand 
forecast 
𝐾𝑎 , 𝑎 ∈ (0, ℎ, 𝑙) Capacity decision of supplier 
under trust, 𝑠 = 𝑎, and mistrust, 
𝑎 = 0  
𝜋𝑆(∙), 𝜋𝐵(∙) Expected profits supplier (S), 
buyer (B) 
𝜋0
𝐵, 𝜋𝑙,ℎ
𝐵   Buyer’s ex-ante expected profits 
under mistrust and trust 
respectively 
The end-customer demand, 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 = {ℎ, 𝑙}, is random 
and follows either a distribution with a (relatively) low 
mean, 𝜇𝑙, or a relatively high mean, 𝜇ℎ. The standard 
deviation, 𝜎, is identical for both demand distributions. 
The CDFs and PDFs are denoted by 𝐹𝑖(∙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖(∙), 𝑖 =
{ℎ, 𝑙}  respectively. The demand distribution that is 
relevant for a given period follows a Bernoulli process. 
The a priori probability of facing the end-customer 
demand distribution 𝐷ℎ is 𝑝. The a priori probability of 
facing the end-customer demand 𝐷𝑙  is 1 − 𝑝. 
Information about the relevant demand distribution in a 
period is asymmetric. The buyer knows which one of the 
two distributions the end-customer demand follows in a 
given period, while her supplier only knows the a priori 
probabilities. 
Forecast sharing: The buyer possesses more 
accurate forecast information than her supplier. The 
buyer knows the relevant period’s demand distribution, 
while her supplier only knows the a priori probabilities 
of the demand distributions. The supplier is interested in 
a more accurate demand forecast, because this would 
enable him to better tailor the capacity to actual market 
conditions. The buyer can share her private demand 
forecast via a non-binding signal 𝑠 = {ℎ, 𝑙}. Her supplier 
may trust the signal and make his capacity decision, 𝐾𝑠, 
assuming that the demand follows 𝐷𝑠. Alternatively, the 
supplier may ignore the signal (further on denoted as 
                                                 
2 As with Ren et al. [23], we assume that all supply chain actors are 
fully rational and expected profit maximizers. This implicitly 
assumes that the payoffs of the other party do not matter (i.e., other 
regarding preferences are absent). However, considering interaction  
punishment) and build up capacity 𝐾0. Figure 1 
summarizes the one-shot game’s decision sequence. 
 
Figure 1. Decision sequence in the one-shot 
game 
The buyer’s and supplier’s profits depend on the 
actual demand distribution, 𝐷𝑖 , and the supplier’s 
capacity decision 𝐾𝑎 , 𝑎 ∈ (0, ℎ, 𝑙).
2 
𝜋𝑆(𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑎) = 𝑤 ∙ ∫ 𝑑 ⋅ 𝑓𝑖(𝑑)𝑑𝑑 + 𝑤
𝐾𝑎
0
⋅ ∫ 𝐾𝛼 ⋅ 𝑓𝑖(𝑑)𝑑𝑑
∞
𝐾𝑎
− 𝐾𝑎 ⋅ 𝑐
= 𝑤 ∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾𝑎) ∙ 𝑓𝑖(𝑑) 𝑑𝑑
𝐾𝑎
0
+ (𝑤 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝐾𝑎 
(1) 
𝜋𝐵(𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑎) = (𝑟 − 𝑤)
∙ ∫ 𝑑 ⋅ 𝑓𝑖(𝑑)𝑑𝑑 + (𝑟 − 𝑤)
𝐾𝑎
0
⋅ ∫ 𝐾𝑎 ⋅ 𝑓𝑖(𝑑)𝑑𝑑
∞
𝐾𝑎
= (𝑟 − 𝑤) ∙ 𝜇𝑖 − (𝑟 − 𝑤)
∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾𝑎) 𝑓𝑖(𝑑) 𝑑𝑑
∞
𝐾𝑎
 
(2) 
We assume that a trusting supplier builds up the 
supply chain’s optimal capacity. Thus, the supplier 
considers the supply chain’s profit margin, 𝑟 − 𝑐, 
instead of his individual profit margin, 𝑤 − 𝑐 (see [23] 
p. 85). The supplier’s optimal capacity decision under 
trust then follows from: 
𝐾𝑠 = arg max
𝐾
   𝑟 ∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾) ∙ 𝑓𝑠(𝑑) 𝑑𝑑
𝐾
0
+ (𝑟 − 𝑐)
∙ 𝐾  with 𝑠 ∈ (ℎ, 𝑙). 
(3) 
The supplier may also mistrust the signal and make his 
capacity decision based on the a priori information: 
𝐾0 = argmax
𝐾
  𝑝 ∙ (𝑤 ∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾) ∙ 𝑓ℎ(𝑑) 𝑑𝑑
𝐾
0
)
+ (1 − 𝑝)
∙ (𝑤 ∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾) ∙ 𝑓𝑙(𝑑) 𝑑𝑑
𝐾
0
)
+ (𝑤 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝐾. 
(4) 
Further, we denote the buyer’s ex-ante expected 
profits (i.e., expected profits before the buyer 
of supply chain actors (e.g., the buyer lies, the supplier suffers, and 
the buyer cares about this fact) might trigger various sorts of 
behavior (esp. related to other regarding preferences). As it stands 
now, we abstract from this issue. 
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determined the actual demand distribution for the 
period) under mistrust 
𝜋0
𝐵 = 𝑝𝜋𝐵(𝐷ℎ, 𝐾0) + (1 − 𝑝)𝜋
𝐵(𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾0) (5) 
and under trust 
𝜋𝑙,ℎ
𝐵 = 𝑝𝜋𝐵(𝐷ℎ, 𝐾ℎ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝜋
𝐵(𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾𝑙) (6) 
It has been well established that the buyer’s 
dominant strategy in the one-shot game is to signal a 
high demand forecast, while the supplier’s dominant 
strategy is to ignore the forecast. The supply chain 
parties are caught in a babbling equilibrium (see [23]). 
We briefly review the underlying line of argumentation. 
Since the buyer does not carry any unit capacity 
costs, 𝑐, she has a strict preference for higher capacity 
levels. Because a trusting supplier builds up higher 
capacity under a high forecast than under a low forecast, 
𝐾ℎ > 𝐾𝑙 , the buyer’s dominant strategy is to always 
signal a high demand forecast 𝑠 = ℎ. The supplier 
anticipates this uninformative signaling behavior and 
ignores/mistrusts the conveyed demand forecast. 
Repeated interaction & review strategy: Similar 
to Ren et al. [23], we model a long-lasting supplier-
buyer relationship as an infinitely repeated game. The 
notation used for the analysis of the review strategy is 
summarized in Table 2. Let 𝑡 denote the time index of 
the stage game. The same decision sequence applies as 
in the one-stage game (see Figure 1). The discount rate 
is denoted by 𝛿. Time is divided into a sequence of 
review phases and punishment phases. The maximum 
length of a review phase is 𝑅 periods, the length of a 
punishment phase is 𝑀. During a review phase, the 
supplier evaluates by comparing the forecast with the 
order via statistical inference if the buyer’s conveyed 
forecast is credible or not. If the reported forecast is 
assessed as credible, a credibility index 𝐼𝑡 is 
incremented by one. Low demand forecasts are always 
assessed as credible. When forecasts are high, the 
credibility index is only incremented if the determined 
demand is larger than a critical value, 𝑑 ≥ 𝑑𝑢. The 
credibility index is not incremented for demand 
realizations smaller than 𝑑𝑢, i.e., 𝐼𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡−1. Thus, 
similar to truth-telling, the probability of being 
evaluated as credible is 
𝑆 = 𝑝[1 − 𝐹ℎ(𝑑𝑢)] + (1 − 𝑝) (7) 
The buyer fails the review at the end of a review 
phase if 𝐼𝑅 < 𝑞, and passes the review if 𝐼𝑅 ≥ 𝑞, where 
𝑞 denotes the credibility threshold. A review phase is 
restarted if the buyer no longer has an incentive to report 
truthfully, because her trust index is too high. We 
elaborate on the restart of a review phase later in this 
paper. 
We denote the buyer’s normalized expected profits 
at the beginning of the game as 𝜋𝑧
𝐵, and the normalized 
expected profits when there are n periods remaining in 
the review phase (i.e., in period 𝑡 = 𝑅 − 𝑛) and given a 
trust index 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑥, as 𝜋𝑛,𝑥
𝐵 . 
Table 2. Notation of the repeated game and the 
review strategy 
𝑡 Time index of the stage game (period) 
𝐼𝑡 Credibility index in period t 
𝑞 Credibility threshold 
𝑑𝑢 Demand realization threshold below which a 
high demand forecast signal is assessed as 
untruthful (𝑑 < 𝑑𝑢) 
𝑅 Length of the review phase 
𝑛 Number of periods remaining in the review 
phase 
𝑀 Length of the punishment phase 
𝛿 Discount factor 
𝑆 Probability of being evaluated as trustworthy 
when reporting honestly 
𝜆 Probability of failing the review despite 
reporting honestly 
𝑡𝑠 Earliest point at which a review phase is 
restarted 
𝜋𝑧
𝐵(∙) Buyer’s normalized expected profits at the 
beginning of a review phase 
𝜋𝑛,𝑥
𝐵  Buyer’s normalized expected profits when 
there are n periods remaining in the review 
phase (i.e., in period t = R − n) and given a 
trust index 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑥. 
Truth-telling equilibrium: For our laboratory 
experiments, we construct the review strategy 
parameters in such a manner that truth-telling and trust 
form an equilibrium. The review strategy parameters 
must therefore ensure that a) in each period during the 
review phase, the buyer conveys the forecast truthfully, 
even if the trust index needs to be incremented in order 
to avoid failing the review, and b) that the buyer reports 
the forecast truthfully at the beginning of a new review 
phase. 
We first formalize condition (a) ― that is, the 
buyer’s credibility index 𝐼𝑡 must be incremented in all 
periods 1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑅 − 1 ― in order to avoid failing the 
review. In any given period of the review phase, the 
buyer reports truthfully whether 
(1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐵(𝐾ℎ , 𝐷𝑙) + 𝛿(1 − 𝐹𝑙(𝑑𝑢))𝜋𝑛−1,𝑞−(𝑛−1)
𝐵
+ 𝐹𝑙(𝑑𝑢)[𝛿(1 − 𝛿
𝑀)𝜋0
𝐵
+ 𝛿𝑀+1𝜋𝑧
𝐵]
≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐵(𝐾𝑙 , 𝐷𝑙)
+ 𝛿(1 − 𝐹ℎ(𝑑𝑢))𝜋𝑛−1,𝑞−(𝑛−1)
𝐵
+ 𝐹ℎ(𝑑𝑢)[𝛿(1 − 𝛿
𝑀)𝜋0
𝐵
+ 𝛿𝑀+1𝜋𝑧
𝐵] 
(8) 
The left-hand side of (8) formalizes the buyer’s 
normalized expected profits when lying. The first term 
is the normalized expected profit when facing low 
demand and reporting high demand. The second term 
depicts the normalized expected profits when the lie is 
not revealed (i.e., the demand is higher than the 
threshold 𝑑𝑢), and the trust index is therefore 
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incremented by one. The third term depicts the 
normalized expected profits when the lie is detected 
(i.e., the demand is lower than the threshold 𝑑𝑢). In this 
case, the buyer faces 𝑀 periods of mistrust. Afterwards, 
a new review phase starts with normalized expected 
profits of 𝜋𝑧
𝐵. In turn, the right-hand side of (8) 
formalizes the normalized expected profits when the 
buyer reports truthfully. Because of the stochastic nature 
of a signal assessed as credible even under truthful 
reporting, all three basic terms on the left-hand side of 
the inequality also occur. Rearranging (8) gives 
𝜋𝐵(𝐾ℎ , 𝐷𝑙) − 𝜋
𝐵(𝐾𝑙 , 𝐷𝑙)
≤
𝐹𝑙(𝑑𝑢) − 𝐹ℎ(𝑑𝑢)
(1 − 𝛿)
[𝛿𝜋𝑛−1,𝑞−(𝑛−1)
𝐵
− [𝛿(1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝜋0
𝐵 + 𝛿𝑀+1𝜋𝑧
𝐵]] 
(9) 
We can replace (see [23] p. 89) 
𝜋𝑛−1,𝑞−(𝑛−1)
𝐵 = (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝑙,ℎ
𝐵 ∑ (𝑆𝛿)𝑖
𝑛−2
𝑖=0
+ 𝜋𝑧
𝐵 (𝑆𝛿)𝑛−1
+ [(1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝜋0
𝐵
+ 𝛿𝑀𝜋𝑧
𝐵] ∑ (1 − 𝑆)𝛿𝑖𝑆𝑖−1
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
 
(10) 
in (9) and it follows 
𝜋𝐵(𝐾ℎ , 𝐷𝑙) − 𝜋
𝐵(𝐾𝑙 , 𝐷𝑙)
≤
(𝐹𝑙(𝑑𝑢) − 𝐹ℎ(𝑑𝑢))
(1 − 𝛿)
𝛿
∙ [(1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝑙,ℎ
𝐵 ∑ (𝑆𝛿)𝑖
𝑛−2
𝑖=0
+ 𝜋𝑧
𝐵 (𝑆𝛿)𝑛−1  
+ [(1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝜋0
𝐵
+ 𝛿𝑀𝜋𝑧
𝐵] (∑ (1
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
− 𝑆)𝛿𝑖𝑆𝑖−1 − 1)] 
(11) 
The buyer’s normalized profits at the beginning of a 
review phase can be approximated by (see [23] p. 92) 
𝜋𝑧
𝐵 =
(1 − 𝛿𝑅−𝑞)𝜋𝑙,ℎ
𝐵 𝜆
1 − 𝛿𝑅−𝑞+𝑀𝜆 − 𝛿𝑡𝑠(1 − 𝜆)
+
𝛿𝑅−𝑞(1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝜋0
𝐵𝜆
1 − 𝛿𝑅−𝑞+𝑀𝜆 − 𝛿𝑡𝑠(1 − 𝜆)
+
(1 − 𝛿𝑡𝑠)𝜋𝑙,ℎ
𝐵 (1 − 𝜆)
1 − 𝛿𝑅−𝑞+𝑀𝜆 − 𝛿𝑡𝑠(1 − 𝜆)
 
(12) 
where 𝜆 denotes the probability that the customer 
will fail the review despite reporting truthfully and 𝑡𝑠 
denotes the earliest point at which the review phase can 
be restarted. Ren et al. [23] show that the likelihood of 
the buyer failing the review if she reports the forecast 
always truthfully and is only evaluated at date 𝑅, 
determines an upper bound for this probability. This 
                                                 
3 Note that a punishment phase may not be triggered even if some of 
the reports are assessed as untruthful, as long as 𝑅 ≠ 𝑞. This is the 
theoretical advantage of review strategies, because punishment phases 
probability follows a binomial distribution, i.e., we use 
the following upper bound  
𝜆 = (
𝑅
𝑅 − 𝑞 + 1
) (1 − 𝑆)𝑅−𝑞+1𝑆𝑞−1 (13) 
A review phase is restarted if the buyer has no 
incentive to truthfully report a forecast, because her trust 
index is too high. Thus, we do not only have to check 
whether the buyer reports truthfully if the trust index has 
to be incremented in each period, i.e., 𝐼𝑛 = 𝑞 − 𝑛, but 
also whether one or more forecasts might still not be 
reliable, i.e., 𝐼𝑛 > 𝑞 − 𝑛.
3 We now formulate condition 
(b) that must hold in a truth-telling equilibrium.  
In the first period of a new review phase (where there 
is still leeway to be assessed as not reliable without 
failing the review), the buyer reports truthfully as long 
as the following inequality holds:  
(𝐹𝑙(𝑑𝑢) − 𝐹ℎ(𝑑𝑢))
∙ ((𝜋𝑙,ℎ
𝐵 − 𝜋𝑧
𝐵)
∙ [∑ (
𝑅 − 𝑞 + 𝑖
𝑅 − 𝑞
)
𝑞−2
𝑖=0
𝛿𝑅−𝑞+𝑖+1𝑆𝑖(1 − 𝑆)𝑅−𝑞
− ∑ (
𝑞 − 1 + 𝑖
𝑞 − 1
) 𝛿𝑞+1(1 − 𝑆)𝑖𝑆𝑞−1
𝑅−𝑞−1
𝑖=0
]
− (
𝑅 − 1
𝑅 − 𝑞
) 𝑆𝑞−1(1 − 𝑆)𝑅−𝑞 ∑ 𝛿𝑅+𝑖(𝜋𝑧
𝐵
𝑀
𝑖=1
− 𝜋0
𝐵)) ≥ 𝜋𝐵(𝐾ℎ , 𝐷𝑙) − 𝜋
𝐵(𝐾𝑙 , 𝐷𝑙) 
(14) 
The left-hand side of Formula (14) depicts the 
benefit of reporting truthfully in a given period by 
mapping all possible payoff paths and the corresponding 
probabilities. As long as the inequality holds, the buyer 
has no incentive to report dishonestly in order to obtain 
the short-term gain depicted on the right-hand side of 
the inequality. We refer to Ren et al. [23] (p. 90) for 
further interpretation of this formula. 
Finally, from (14), we can compute the earliest point 
at which a review phase is restarted, which we need in 
order to numerically evaluate the incentive 
compatibility in (a). The buyer has the least incentive to 
report truthfully if the trust index has been incremented 
in each period so far, i.e., if 𝐼𝑅−𝑛 = 𝑅 − 𝑛. Thus, the 
earliest point at which the review phase may be restarted 
can be computed numerically by iteratively reducing 𝑅 
and 𝑞 in formula (14) by one unit. Once the left-hand 
side of formula (14) turns negative, the earliest point 𝑡𝑠 
is identified and can be replaced in (12). The obtained 
lower bound of 𝜋𝑧
𝐵 can then be used to calculate 
incentive compatibility in formula (11).  
Finally, note that we refer to a review strategy 
whenever the buyer might be evaluated as dishonest at 
are expected to occur less frequently than in a trigger strategy, where 
𝑅 = 𝑞. 
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least once (i.e., the credibility index is not incremented), 
while not entering the punishment phase, i.e., credibility 
index is smaller than the review length (𝑞 < 𝑅). We 
refer to a trigger strategy whenever each negative 
assessment leads directly to punishments (i.e., 𝑅 = 𝑞). 
 
4. Experiment 
 
The focus of our experiment is the buyer’s reaction 
to a supplier’s given repeated game strategy. We 
analyze the performance of two repeated game 
strategies ― the review strategy and the trigger strategy 
― by varying the credibility threshold 𝑞 and the review 
length 𝑅 between treatments. We designed the repeated 
game strategies such that they support truth-telling. We 
automated the supplier’s decision and thereby eliminate 
potential fairness concerns in the supply chain 
interaction. All parameters were known to the buyer, 
such that we expected a fully rational and profit-
maximizing buyer to report truthfully throughout the 
game. In the following, we first present the game 
parameters that are identical in both treatments, 
thereafter we turn to our treatment design, and finally 
we present the details of our experimental procedure. 
 
4.1 Parameterization 
 
Customer demand is normally distributed with 
𝐷𝑙~𝒩(150, 40
2) and 𝐷ℎ~𝒩(300, 40
2). The high 
demand distribution has an a priori probability of 𝑝 =
0.5. We set the end-customer price to 𝑟 = 12, the 
wholesale price to 𝑤 = 7, and the unit capacity cost to 
𝑐 = 6. 
At the end of each period, a random draw decides, 
with probability 0.1, whether the game ends, or another 
base game is played. We thus induce a discount factor 
of 𝛿 = 0.9. A high forecast signal 𝑠 = ℎ is assessed as 
credible if 𝑑 ≥ 𝑑𝑢 = 200. A punishment phase of 𝑀 =
4 periods starts if the buyer cannot reach the credibility 
threshold 𝑞 in the remainder of the current review phase.  
Table 3. Buyer payoff matrix 
Low demand 𝑫𝒍 
 Review phase 
Punishment 
phase 
𝒔 = 𝒍 𝜋𝐵(𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾𝑙) = 690.16 𝜋
𝐵(𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾0)
= 637.54 𝒔 = 𝒉 𝜋𝐵(𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾ℎ) = 750.00 
High demand 𝑫𝒉 
 Review phase 
Punishment 
phase 
𝒔 = 𝒍 𝜋𝐵(𝐷ℎ, 𝐾𝑙) = 749.40 𝜋
𝐵(𝐷ℎ, 𝐾0)
= 663.70 𝒔 = 𝒉 𝜋𝐵(𝐷ℎ, 𝐾ℎ) = 1,380.30 
The payoff in each of the buyer’s periods depends 
on the demand realization 𝑑, the current phase ― i.e., 
the review phase or the punishment phase ― and, in the 
review phase, on her signal 𝑠. The supplier’s capacity 
decisions are 𝐾0 =  132.79, 𝐾𝑙 =  150, 𝐾ℎ =  300. The 
buyer’s expected profits in the review phase and 
punishment phase are summarized in Table 3. 
 
4.2 Experimental procedure and design 
 
We recruited 48 subjects from a seminar on 
behavioral economics to participate in our experiments. 
We randomly assigned the subjects to one of two 
sessions (26 subjects to session 1 and 22 subjects to 
session 2). All subjects participated in two treatments: 
the review treatment and the trigger treatment. We thus 
focused on a with-in subject comparison. In session 1 
(2), we started with the review (trigger) treatment, 
followed by the trigger (review) treatment. We 
randomized the number of periods per treatment and 
session before conducting the experiment (review 
treatment: 30 periods; trigger treatment: 25 periods) but 
did not inform the subjects how many rounds they 
would be playing. The subjects only knew the 
probabilities with which we simulated the number of 
rounds. In both treatments and sessions, we ensured that 
the relative frequency of high and low demands was 
equal within a review phase and within a punishment 
phase. By this means, we ensured that there were no 
highly unlikely realization sequences that could 
confound our results.  
We played the review treatment with a review phase 
lasting for 𝑅 = 10 and a credibility threshold of 𝑞 = 9 
to evaluate the effect of the review phase. The earliest 
point at which the review phase is restarted is 𝑡𝑆 = 4. 
The trigger treatment has a review phase of 𝑅 = 1 and 
a credibility threshold of 𝑞 = 1,   i.e., the buyer must be 
assessed as credible in each period in order to avoid 
entering the punishment phase. 
At the start of each session, we assigned each subject 
to a random seat in the laboratory. The subjects received 
written instructions (see online appendix at 
http://www.emwifo.ovgu.de/Research/Supplementary+
material.html) that captured the contents of the 
experiment that did not change between treatments. All 
the relevant game and treatment data were available on 
the computer screen. We answered all questions in 
private, before we played 20 training periods with 𝛿 =
0.0, which we did not pay off. Thereafter, each subject 
played the two computerized treatments (z-Tree, [11]): 
the review treatment and the trigger treatment. Beside 
the parameters described in Section 4.1, the computer 
screen displayed the probability for every combination 
of low and high demand in the remaining periods of the 
current review/punishment phase, as well as the 
distribution of demands 𝑑 for both 𝐷𝑙  and 𝐷ℎ. After the 
two treatments, we paid the subjects according to their 
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performance in the game. The subjects received €0.25 
for 1,000 points. All in all, the subjects earned an 
average of €13.62 for an experiment lasting about two 
hours. 
 
5. Results 
 
In the remainder of this section, we present the 
experimental results. We focus our analysis on the first 
20 periods, ensuring that every honest player who is not 
mistakenly identified as not reliable, played at least two 
complete review phases of 10 periods. 
 
5.1 Honesty 
 
According to Ren et al. [23], we designed the review 
strategy such that truth-telling and trust is the payoff 
maximizing strategy, i.e., we expect the subjects to 
report their true demand distribution throughout the 
game. Since the punishment cost for the subject is 
identical in both treatments, and the consequences of 
being assessed as non-reliable are more direct in the 
trigger treatment (i.e., assessed non-reliability 
immediately leads to a punishment phase), truth-telling 
and trust are also the equilibrium in this treatment. In 
sum, we expect truth-telling in both treatments 
throughout all periods. 
 
Figure 2. Honesty per period of review phase 
(given 𝒅 = 𝒍) 
In the review treatment, nine subjects never lie, 
while 30 subjects never lie in the trigger treatment. In 
88% (standard deviation [SD]: 0.26) of all occurrences 
of a low demand, the subjects in the trigger treatment 
are honest. In the review treatment, however, the 
subjects are only honest in 75% (SD: 0.23) of the 
periods with low demand. Hence, the subjects are 
significantly more honest in the trigger treatment than in 
the review treatment (Wilcoxon test, two-sided, 
p=0.001). Note that the high probability of lying in the 
review treatment is not solely based on behavior in the 
4th period (𝑡𝑆 = 4) of the review phase to ensure that the 
review phase lasts for 10 periods (see Figure 2, dashed 
vertical line): In 8 out of 10 periods in the review phase, 
the average honesty in the review treatment lies below 
the average honesty in the trigger treatment per period. 
In sum, we find - in contrast to game theoretic prediction 
- lying in both treatments, but a higher level in the 
review treatment. 
 
5.2 Punishments 
 
According to Ren et al. [23], we should expect fewer 
punishment phases in our review treatment than in the 
trigger treatment if all the subjects were to follow the 
truth-telling strategy. However, we observe more lying 
in the review treatment (see Section 5.1) than in the 
trigger treatment. This effect might diminish the 
theoretically positive consequences of not directly 
entering the punishment phase in the review treatment 
once a subject is assessed as not reliable. 
Subjects in the review treatment enter the 
punishment phase an average 0.58 times (SD: 0.77), 
while they enter it 0.71 times (SD: 1.05) in the trigger 
treatment. Contrary to the theoretical prediction under a 
truth-telling strategy, the mean frequency of the 
punishment phases does not differ significantly between 
the treatments (Wilcoxon test, two-sided, p=0.475). 
As argued above, the lack of treatment differences 
might be due to a higher lying frequency in the review 
treatment. We therefore analyze the impact of lying on 
the frequency of punishment phases in a mixed effect 
logistic regression, using each decision (per period and 
subject) as one observation. 
Table 4. Regression analysis of influencing 
factors on punishment in the next period 
 Model I Model II 
# of lies --  3.932 (0.34)** 
Dummy 
trigger 
0.197 (0.26) 0.852 (0.29)** 
Intercept -3.634 (0.23)** -5.472 (0.36)** 
N 1920  1920  
AIC 562.6  384.6  
BIC 579.3  406.9  
Log likel. -278.3  -188.3  
Notes: The significance levels of the observed 
coefficients are: ** 𝑝 < 0.01. No star indicates 
significance levels 𝑝 > 0.1 (AIC - Akaike information 
criterion, BIC - Bayesian information criterion) 
The variable “# of lies” captures the number of not 
reliable signals the buyer reported to the supplier in 
previous periods of the treatment. For example, the 
former variable would be two for a buyer who reported 
reliably in eight out of the ten previous periods. The 
dummy trigger is one for our trigger treatment and 
captures the treatment differences. The results in Table 
4 show that the likelihood of punishment phases 
increases with the number of lies and is significantly 
higher in our trigger treatment (column “Model II”). We 
further observe that this effect is non-significant if we 
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omit to account for the number of lies (column “Model 
I”). Thus, the results clearly highlight that the positive 
effects of fewer punishment phases in the review 
treatment does not continue empirically, because buyers 
exhibit less reliable reporting behavior. 
 
5.2 Payoff consequences 
 
The subjects earned on average 1,003.50 points per 
round (𝑆𝐷: 87.81) in the review treatment compared to 
an average of 975.53 points per round (𝑆𝐷: 108.15) in 
the trigger treatment. Although the average payoff in the 
review treatment is higher than in the trigger treatment, 
it does not differ significantly (Wilcoxon test, two-
sided, 𝑝 = 0.111). Thus, the results are qualitatively, 
but not significantly in line with the theoretical 
prediction (i.e., subjects in the review treatment earn 
more than in the trigger treatment).  
We ran two linear mixed regression models on the 
subjects’ overall payoffs in the game to disentangle the 
influencing factors (see Table 5). In the first regression 
(the “Treatment effect” column), we evaluate the 
treatment with regard to the observed payoffs and find 
that the trigger treatment has a weakly significant 
negative effect. Taking the non-parametric analysis and 
the regression analysis into consideration, we find that 
the treatment effects on efficiency is almost significant. 
Table 5. Regr. analysis for payoff differences 
to average payoff when always honest 
 Treatment Effect Impact of honesty 
# of lies --  -22.43 (2.082)** 
Dummy 
Trigger 
-27.97 (16.93)* -58.81 (13.62)** 
Intercept -24.41 (14.22)* 43.34 (11.40)** 
N 96  96  
AIC 1155.5  1083.4  
BIC 1165.7  1096.2  
Log likel. -573.7  -536.7  
Notes: The significance levels of the observed 
coefficients are: ** 𝑝 < 0.001 and * 𝑝 < 0.1. No star 
indicates significance levels 𝑝 > 0.1. Log-likelihood 
statistic: 74.044 (p-value: < 0.001) 
Our second regression (the “Impact of honesty” 
column) adds the number of lies per subject to the 
former regression model. The trigger dummy now turns 
highly significant, indicating a clear efficiency gain in 
the review treatment relative to the trigger treatment. 
However, the higher frequency of lying in the review 
treatment compensates for part of this efficiency gain. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
We present two treatments that compare the review 
and trigger strategies in a supply chain experiment. Both 
strategies are designed such that they support the truth-
telling equilibrium. However, we find a significant 
degree of lying under both strategies. 
While we observe higher than theoretically 
predicted truthfulness and efficiency in cheap talk 
experiments (see [21, 22]), we observe that repeated 
game strategies’ level of efficiency is worse than 
predicted. Our results thus indicate that the efficiency 
gap between cheap talk settings and repeated game 
strategies, which normative analysis predict, is 
overstated. An interesting avenue for future research is 
a direct comparison between cheap talk as an efficiency 
enhancer and repeated game strategies. Further, this 
result highlights that a company would suffer from 
allowing managers to communicate the forecast, instead 
of automatically transmitting them to their supply chain 
partners if they face an optimally designed repeated 
game strategy. 
A comparison of two frequently discussed 
competing repeated game strategies shows that review 
strategies’ higher complexity does not automatically 
lead to higher efficiency. As theoretically predicted, we 
do observe fewer punishment phases in the review 
strategy than in the trigger strategy if we fix the degree 
of lying. However, buyers exhibit a significantly higher 
tendency to lie when confronted with a review strategy, 
which diminishes the favorable effect of less 
punishment. 
Our experiments are not designed to test the 
behavioral phenomena underlying this observation. We 
conjecture that review strategies’ higher complexity 
makes it harder for subjects to identify truth-telling as 
the profit maximizing behavior. This is in line with 
experimental work (e.g., [8, 18]) showing that human 
participants find it difficult to apply backward-induction 
for more than two periods. 
Another explanation for our observation that buyers 
lie more frequently in a review strategy than in a trigger 
strategy may be that the consequence of lying is harsher 
in the latter. Thus, increasing the burden of lying in the 
review strategy might improve the benefit of a 
theoretically better review strategy. Thus, further 
research should test whether our results are sensitive to 
parameter variations. However, once there is a 
practically relevant upper bound for critical parameters, 
such as the length of the punishment phase, or the 
discount factor, our results indicate that review 
strategies are not a better choice for all supply chain 
interactions. 
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